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Abstract 
In this paper we present a static verification framework to 
support the design and verification of secure peer-to-peer 
applications. The framework supports the specification, 
modeling, and analysis of security aspects together with the 
general characteristics of the system, during early stages of 
the development life-cycle. The approach avoids security 
issues to be taken into consideration as a separate layer that is 
added to the system as an afterthought by the use of security 
protocols. The main functionality supported by the framework 
are concerned with the modeling of the system together with 
its security aspects by using an extension of UML, modeling of 
abuse cases to represent scenarios of attackers and assist with 
the identification of properties to be verified, specification of 
properties to be verified in a graphical template language, 
verification of the models against the properties, and 
visualization of the results of the verification process.  
1. Introduction 
In the last years, various approaches have been proposed to 
address security issues during the development of software 
systems. A new area of research called secure software 
engineering has emerged to support the integration of security 
and software engineering [1][27]. This new area of research 
has been proposed to fulfill the lack (a) in existing approaches, 
techniques, and methodologies in the area of software 
engineering to provide support for the analysis and design of 
security requirements and properties, and (b) in existing 
approaches for security engineering which concentrate on 
security issues and consider limited aspects of the software 
system as a whole. The normal procedure is to add security 
characteristics as another layer in the system on an ad-hoc 
basis after the system is built, which generates conflicts 
[10][27]. Moreover, in such setting, an application is 
considered to be secure when it uses security protocols and 
cryptographic techniques.  
The use of security protocols and cryptographic techniques 
gave rise to the development of formal verification techniques 
for security protocols [1][17][18][25][29]. Verification of 
software systems has been the subject of extensive research in 
which various approaches and tools have been proposed to 
support checking and analyzing that the system conforms to its 
requirements and specifications [8][12][19]. However, existing 
formal verification techniques that supports security are (i) 
limited to verify protocol designs, (ii) cannot guarantee 
security properties of protocol implementations, (iii) do not 
consider the system as a whole, and (iv) uses disjoint security 
models and system design models that are expressed in 
different ways [20]. As suggested in [3][10][11][15][24][26], 
security should be considered from the early stages and 
through all the stages of software development. Therefore, it is 
necessary to propose verification approaches that consider 
security aspects to be specified, modeled, and analyzed during 
early stages of the development life-cycle, as well as 
embedded with other characteristics of the system, and not as a 
separate layer that is added to the system as an afterthought in 
the form of security protocols.  
The above situation is important to peer-to-peer 
applications. The high distribution, autonomy, and dynamic 
characteristics of the peers may cause security vulnerability to 
the system as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
security since early stages of the system development and to 
consider the verification of security issues together with other 
aspects of the system.  
The work presented in this paper focus on a static 
verification framework to support the analysis of abstract 
behavioral specifications of secure peer-to-peer systems. More 
specifically, the static verification framework requires 
capabilities to address some important challenges including 
the provision of support for: 
• The construction of design models representing abstract 
behavioral of peer-to-peer system specifications that takes 
into consideration both security and general 
characteristics of the system; 
• The construction of abuse cases representing scenarios of 
attackers in order to consider ways in which the system 
can be attacked, identify threats to the system, and elicit 
ways in which the security of the system can be 
invalidated; 
• The specification of security and general application 
properties (requirements) to be verified against the 
abstract behavioral system specifications; 
• The static verification of system specifications against 
security and general application properties (requirements); 
• The visualization of the results of the static verification 
process. 
The above challenges have been specified based on 
requirements and scenarios identified by industrial partners in 
the areas of media and security in an European project 
focusing on mobile peer-to-peer security (PEPERS) [28]. 
These challenges, scenarios, and requirements have been the 
main drivers to the framework described in this paper. 
The static verification framework assumes the use of an 
extension of UML (viz. UMLSec [21][22]) to describe the 
design models of the system to be verified and the use of UML 
to specify the abuse cases. The framework also includes a 
property editor to support the specification of the properties to 
be verified and a property selector to assist the designers to 
choose the properties to be verified from a library of 
properties. The verification of the properties against the design 
models is executed by the model checker SPIN [31] after 
translating the properties and design models into LTL [34] and 
SPIN Promela language, respectively. The verification of 
security protocols is executed by using AVISPA tool [4]. The 
results of the verification process is presented to the designer 
by highlighting the parts in the design models that have 
violated a certain property, by indicating that the property has 
not been violated, or by indicating that a conclusion cannot be 
drawn from the verification process for a certain property. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In 
Section 2 we present an example that will be used throughout 
the paper to illustrate our approach. In Section 3 we describe 
the static verification framework. In Section 4 we give an 
account of related work. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize 
the work and present directions for future work. 
 
2. Example 
 
In order to illustrate, consider an example of a peer-to-peer 
system to exchange job tasks and associated data between 
different journalists and photographers working in a media 
company. This example has been extracted from the scenarios 
specified by the industrial partners of the PEPERS project. In 
the example the system is composed of several peers with 
different roles such as managers, chief journalists, journalists, 
photographers, editors, legal and advertisement staff. The 
access to the system by the peers is either by the use of 
desktop computers or mobile devices (PDAs).  
Consider the scenario with six peers participating in a new 
assignment. These peers have the roles of one manager, one 
chief journalist, two journalists, one photographer, and one 
editor. Suppose that an important international event is about 
to happen and the manager of the company identifies this 
potential event and contacts one of the chief journalists to 
discuss a plan to cover the event. The chief journalist selects a 
team of people that will be able to cover the event. This team 
of people is composed of two journalists, one photographer 
that works together with one of the journalists, and one editor. 
The two journalists and the photographer are already on the 
site of the event and will be responsible for covering, writing 
notes, and taking pictures of the event. The editor is located in 
the main branch of the company and should dedicate all his 
time to give support for preparing and editing the reports of 
this event during the next three days.  
Given the importance of the event, the manager and chief 
journalist would like their company to have exclusivity of the 
story and, therefore, all information and requests exchanged 
between any of the peers should not be intercepted by anyone 
else inside and outside the company. In addition, each of the 
two journalists covering the event should not exchange notes 
and reports about the event, since the chief journalist is 
interested in receiving independent information about the 
event from each journalist. Moreover, it is necessary to make 
sure that the exchanged information between the different 
peers is always from the correct party so that false information 
is not sent and received from unauthorized and malicious 
parties. Furthermore, it is also necessary to guarantee that the 
information sent from one peer to another is not modified 
when in transit. 
The journalists and photographers communicate with the 
chief journalist by mobile devices. The chief journalist, 
manager, and editor communicate with each other and with the 
other members of the team by using their respective desktop 
computers. Table 1 shows a summary of the tasks executed by 
the different peers in the scenario. 
 
Table 1: Tasks executed by the peers in the scenario 
Manager becomes aware of a new event and contacts chief 
journalist about the event 
Chief journalist selects team of people to cover the event and 
contacts them about the event 
Chief journalist sends messages to journalists and 
photographer about the coverage of the event and any relevant 
information for them to execute the task 
Journalists and photographer attend the event and prepare 
notes and take pictures about the event 
Journalists and photographer send material about the event to 
chief journalist 
Chief journalist receives the material, approves them, and 
sends the material to editor 
Editor receives the material, combines the notes into a single 
report, and makes all necessary amendments and adjustments  
Editor sends the report to chief journalist for approval 
Chief journalist approves the report or suggest any further 
amendments to editor 
After final approval from chief journalist, editor sends report 
to be printed 
 
The described scenario includes some security properties 
such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and role 
based access control. A definition of these properties based on 
definitions given in the literature is presented below: 
 
• Authentication: It is concerned with the property of 
guaranteeing the identity of a person or entity. An example of 
authentication in the scenario is “the editor can only send the 
report for final approval to the chief journalist”. In this 
example, the chief journalist needs to be authenticated before 
the editor sends the report. 
• Confidentiality: Also known as secrecy, is concerned with 
the property of guaranteeing that data is not made available to 
unauthorized individuals. An example of confidentiality in the 
scenario is “only the chief journalist can receive notes about 
the events from the journalists covering the event”.  
• Integrity: It is concerned with the property of guaranteeing 
that data is not modified when in transit and that sent and 
received data are the same. An example of integrity in the 
scenario is given by the requirement that “the information sent 
from one peer to another cannot be modified when in transit”. 
•  Role based access control: It is concerned with the access 
rights of an entity over resources in the system based on 
individual roles. An example of role based access control is 
the scenario is: “the journalists prepare notes while the 
photographer takes pictures of the event”. 
 
3. Static Verification Framework 
 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the architecture of the 
static verification framework. As shown in the figure, the 
framework is composed of (a) Design Model Constructor 
(DMC), (b) Abuse Case Constructor (ACC), (c) Property 
Editor (PE), (d) Property Selector (PS), (e) Static Verification 
Tools (SVT), (f) Results Visualization Tool (RVT), and (g) 
Translators. We explain below each of the components of the 
framework. 
 
3.1. Design model constructor 
 
This component is responsible to support the design of 
structural and behavioral models of the system being 
developed together with its security aspects. In addition, if a 
specific security protocol is used, this protocol can also be 
modeled using this component. We propose the design models 
and security protocols to be specified in an extension of 
UMLSec [21]. As outlined in [11], the adoption and extension 
of standards like UML to include modeling of security features 
is quite attractive. Moreover, as affirmed by [14], an object-
oriented approach to support security should be preferred over 
a procedural approach due to the value of information hiding 
and encapsulation in the design of secure systems. The 
rationale and advantages of using a UML-based approach to 
support the modeling of the system and security protocols 
specifications are many: (i) UML is the de facto standard to 
support design of software systems, (ii) UML has been largely 
used in industrial settings and there are a large number of 
developers familiar and trained in UML, (iii) there are many 
tools to support the use of UML, (iv) UML offers a relative 
precise definition as well as notions of modularity, 
compactness, and reuse, which comply to policy 
representation, and (v) UML allows for the possibility of 
unifying design of systems and security policies. 
 
 
Figure 1. Architecture of static verification 
framework 
 
The design models and security protocols in our work are 
based on an extension of UMLSec to allow modeling of 
security requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and access control, and modeling of the 
functionality of peer-to-peer applications such as roles, 
resources, operation, and events.  
UMLSec [21] provides stereotypes, tags, and constraints 
described in a profile that can be used to represent security 
requirements. In order to illustrate, consider part of the 
scenario described in Section 2 modeled in a class and 
sequence diagram with UMLSec extensions for journalist and 
chief journalist classes shown in Figure 2. In this example the 
classes are stereotyped as <<critical>>, denoting that these 
classes have sensitive data. The stereotype <<critical>> has 
associated tags {authenticity}, {secrecy}, and {integrity} to 
represent the security requirements on the respective data. As 
shown in the figure, the representation of these requirements 
does not guarantee that the system really conforms to them 
and need to be further verified (see Subsection 3.4). Due to 
space limitations we do not represent here the whole scenario 
in UMLSec and do not discuss all the different stereotypes 
tags, and constraints of the profile. 
 
3.2 Abuse case constructor 
 
This component allows for the specification of scenarios 
from the perspective of attackers or malicious users of the 
system. More specifically, abuse cases can be used to assist 
engineers of the system to consider ways in which the system 
can be attacked, identify potential threats to the system, and 
elicit ways in which the security aspects of the system can be 
invalidated. We propose to define abuse cases as UML use 
cases and state machine diagrams due to their popularity and 
use to describe system scenarios. Moreover, the use of state 
machine diagrams allow for a more detailed definition of the 
behavior of the attackers.  
In our framework, the abuse cases can be used to support 
two activities: (a) identification or selection of properties and 
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(b) description of properties. In the first activity, the abuse 
cases are represented as use cases and support the 
identification or selection of properties to be verified by 
illustrating situations that the designers may not be necessarily 
aware. In the second activity, the abuse cases are represented 
as state machines describing properties to be verified which 
can be composed with the design models and verified for their 
termination. In the case of termination, the property (state 
machine) violates the design model. 
As an example of using use cases as abuse case, consider 
the abuse case shown in Figure 3 in which journalist J1 
exchanges notes about the event with journalist J2 (bolded 
arrows), invalidating one of the requirements in the system. 
This situation helps the designer identify the following 
property to be verified in the system: “there should be no 
communication between journalists J1 and J2 during the 
coverage of the event”. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of part of the scenario in UMLSec 
 
3.3. Property editor and property selector 
 
We propose to use a graphical property editor to specify 
the various properties to be verified by the static verification 
tool by using a template language. The idea of using such an 
editor is to avoid having designers to express the properties 
directly in formal languages such as temporal logic formulas 
(CTL[9] and LTL[34]) or regular expressions, as required by 
the majority of verification tools. All the specified properties 
are stored in a Library of Properties. 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of an abuse case 
 
The template language of the property editor is based on 
the work in [13] and specifies properties that will be translated 
into LTL formulae as required by the verification tool (see 
Subsection 3.4). The language allows for the specification of 
expressions separated by operators. 
As an example, consider the secrecy tag represented in 
Figure 2 for eventnote data. More specifically, the tag, the 
operations and dependability in the classes represent the 
requirement that “during the coverage of the event Chief 
Journalist should be the only member in the team that receives 
notes of the event from the Journalists”. Or in other words, “no 
other peer different from Chief Journalist should receive notes 
of the event from Journalists”. The above requirement could 
be expressed in LTL as: 
<> receive(J1, CJ, eventnotes) or 
[] !receive (J1, !CJ, eventnodes) 
Figure 4 shows part of the property editor with the 
specification of the above property. As shown in the figure, 
the template provides predefined values for some of the main 
elements in an expression from which the user can choose, or 
allows the user to input a different value. 
It should be noted that in some cases it might not be 
possible to represent all properties to be verified in the 
template language. In this case, the designer should be able to 
specify the property directly in LTL and the property editor 
supports this functionality. 
In order for the designer to choose the properties to be 
verified by the verification tool for a certain situation, the 
static verification framework contains a Property Selector 
component that allows the designer to browse and choose the 
relevant properties from a library of properties. The selection 
of properties is based on the design models, or the security 
protocols to be verified, and the abuse cases.  
 
 
 
Journalist_J1 
Chief_Journalist 
Journalist_J2 
Prepare notes 
Exchange notes 
J1:Journalist          <<critical>> 
{authenticity = {(username,CJ)    
                         (password,CJ)}} 
{secrecy = {eventnotes}} 
{integrity = {eventnotes}} 
 
username: String; 
password: String; 
eventnotes: String; 
 
execute(snd:String,  
             rcv:String; task:String) 
 
 
CJ:ChiefJournalist          <<critical>> 
{authenticity = {(username,J)    
                            (password,J)}} 
{secrecy = {task}} 
{integrity = {task}} 
 
username: String; 
password: String; 
tasks: String; 
 
receive(snd:String, rcv:String,  
            eventnotes:String) 
approve(eventnotes:String) 
 
 
J2:Journalist           <<critical>> 
 
 
<<send>> 
<<send>> 
CJ J1 J2 E 
execute (task) 
execute (task) 
receive (eventnotes) 
receive (eventnotes) 
receive (approvedeventnotes) 
. . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of the property editor 
 
3.4.  Static verification and visualization tools 
 
In the framework, we propose to use SPIN [31] as the 
static verification tool to support the verification of design 
models of the system, and AVISPA [4] to support the 
verification of security protocols.  
The decision to use model checkers as verification tools 
instead of theorem provers in the framework are due to the 
facts that: (a) theorem provers require human intervention 
during the verification process with knowledge in logic while 
model checkers execute the verification process automatically, 
(b) theorem provers generate a large number of lemmas that 
are not easy to be understood by designers while model 
checkers generate counter examples when a property is 
violated, and (c) the proofs in theorem provers are normally 
complex and intellectually challenging.  
The choice to use SPIN and AVISPA has been based on 
our study of existing verification tools in which we analyzed 
eleven verification model checker tools based on different 
criteria namely: (a) handling of state space explosion problem, 
(b) representation of different types of data structures by the 
modeling languages, (c) representation and manipulation of 
built-in-intruder models, (d) support for dynamic creation of 
processes, (e) availability and extensibility of the tool, (f) 
applicability of the tool, and (g) usability of the tool. These 
criteria have been identified based on the requirements and 
scenarios elicited by the partners in the PEPERS project [28]. 
The results of the study have demonstrated that SPIN can 
satisfy the majority of the analysis criteria and that AVISPA 
has been successfully in verifying a large number of security 
protocols.  
In order to present the results of the verification process, 
the framework contains a graphical Vizualisation Tool that 
shows the parts of the design models that may violate a certain 
property together with the property. In the cases where a 
property is not violated or cannot be processed by the tool (i.e. 
a conclusion cannot be drawn), the visualization tool also 
indicates these situations to the designer. 
3.5. Translators 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the static verification framework 
contains various translators to support the mapping between 
(a) design models represented in UMLSec into Promela [31] 
specification language, (b) security protocols represented in 
UMLSec into HLPLS AVISPA language [4], (c) properties 
expressed in the template language into the property 
specification language of the verification tools, (d) state 
machine diagrams representing the abuse cases that can be 
used as properties, and (e) results of the verification process 
into the visualization tool.  
 
3.6. Discussion 
 
The static verification framework addresses the challenges 
described in Section 1. In addition, it offers the following 
advantages: (a) modeling of peer-to-peer applications together 
with security aspects by using a de facto standard for modeling 
distributed systems; (b) verification of general and security 
requirements of the system; (c) verification of security 
protocols independent of their applicability in the system by 
using specific verification tool; (d) freedom of system 
developers to design their systems independent of the static 
verification process; (e) use of scenarios that consider ways in 
which the system can be attacked or identify potential threats 
to the system; (f) use of a graphical template language to 
specify properties to be verified avoiding system designers to 
be familiar with formal languages; (g) selection of properties 
to be verified based on the design models, security protocols, 
and abuse cases; (h) visualization of the results of the 
verification process in a user friendly way. 
Our approach is different from the work in [21][22], since 
it supports the verification of both security properties and 
general peer-to-peer applications. In addition, although in [22] 
the authors propose the use of SPIN to support model 
checking, this has been restricted to the verification of 
cryptographic protocols. Moreover, the static verification 
framework includes the notion of (a) abuse cases and their 
constructors, (b) property editor, property library, and property 
selection based on abuse cases and design models, and (c) a 
visualization tool to allow the representation of the results of 
the static verification process with respect to the original 
design models and properties.  
 
4. Related Work 
 
Approaches to support secure software engineering can be 
categorized in three main groups based on different software 
development life-cycle phases: (a) security requirements 
engineering and analysis, (b) security modeling and 
development, and (c) secure software code analysis and 
testing.  
Some approaches for security requirements engineering 
and analysis propose the use of misuse cases [2] and abuse 
cases [24] in which a scenario is described from the point of 
view of an attacker to the system. However, although they are 
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Always 
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Other: 
 
 receive Select from List 
J1, CJ, eventnotes 
effective to analyze security threats, they are inappropriate for 
specifying security requirements. In our framework, we use 
abuse cases to assist with the identification of properties to be 
verified and propose ways of using abuse cases to represent 
properties to be verified.  
Other approaches for assisting requirements elicitation, 
specification, and analysis are the common criteria [32] and 
attack trees [35]. The work in [10] defends the idea of using 
roles for defining goals and policies and introduces the notion 
of anti-requirements to represent the requirements of malicious 
users. In [33] the authors propose to use security goals and 
anti-goals in which anti-goals represent malicious obstacles set 
by attackers to threaten the security goals. As outlined in [27], 
in all these approaches security is considered vaguely and 
there is a lack of precise definition for security properties. In 
[36] the authors propose to use i* to support security 
requirements. 
The approaches for security modeling and development 
make use of patterns [13][14], agent oriented methodologies 
[16], and extensions of UML [21][23]. Patterns can be used to 
document common solutions to recurring problems by 
describing security problems that occur in a context and 
presenting solutions accepted among security experts. 
However, the representation and selection of security patterns 
are still empirical tasks and it is not easy to identify the 
patterns to a specific situation. The work in [16] (Secure 
Tropos), combines two software engineering approaches for 
the development of a methodology that takes into account 
security and trust issues as part of the development process. In 
UMLsec [21] the authors proposed a special UML profile to 
represent security requirements. SecureUML [23] integrates 
the specification of access control policies into UML. The 
approach uses UML class diagrams, object diagrams, 
additional stereotypes, and OCL constraints. Our framework 
uses UMLSec to model the system and provides other 
advantages as discussed in Subsection 3.6.  
Techniques for secure software code analysis and testing 
have been advocated in [6][7][30]. These approaches make use 
of static analysis tools to detect security flaw in source code 
[7], theorem prover [6], and testing firewalls [30]. However, 
they cannot solve all security problems and are normally used 
to look for a fixed set of patterns or rules in a source code. 
Although many approaches have been proposed to support 
secure software engineering, to the best of our knowledge, 
these approaches have tackled individual aspects of secure 
software engineering. However, a framework that incorporates 
all the functionality of the static verification framework 
described in this paper has not yet been proposed.   
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The work presented in this paper is part of a large program 
of research to support verification of secure peer-to-peer 
applications. We presented a framework for static verification 
of peer-to-peer applications that allows for various 
functionalities including (a) design of peer-to-peer systems 
that considers general and secure characteristics of the system 
based on UML, (b) use of abuse cases to support the 
identification and specification of properties to be verified, (c) 
specification of security and general application properties to 
be verified in a graphical template language, (d) verification of 
design models against properties, and (e) visualization of the 
verification results embedded in the design models of the 
system. The work presented in this paper contributes to the 
area of secure software engineering by integrating security 
into early stages of software engineering and not as an 
afterthought layer when the system is developed. Currently, 
we are implementing the main components of the framework 
and evaluating the work with the industrial partners in the 
PEPERS project.  
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